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WATCHING ME

THE WAR ON CRIME, PRIVACY
AND THE STATE

published in U.C. Davis Law Review
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K

imberly Bailey joined the IIT Chicago-Kent faculty in fall 2007. Prior to joining
Chicago-Kent’s faculty, she was a visiting scholar and adjunct professor at the University
of Houston Law Center. She also practiced labor and employment law in Houston, Texas,
where she was an associate at Fulbright & Jaworski LLP.
Professor Bailey was a Clarence Darrow Scholar at the University of Michigan Law
School. She graduated cum laude, and she was an associate editor and contributing editor of
the Michigan Law Review. Professor Bailey earned her bachelor of arts degree from Indiana
University in Bloomington, Indiana. She graduated with highest distinction, and she was a
member of Phi Beta Kappa.
Professor Bailey’s research focuses on how social, political and economic inequalities are
reflected in criminal law. She has written extensively about gender violence, and she has also
written about the criminal justice system’s negative effects on the privacy interests of poor
communities of color. She teaches Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence at
Chicago-Kent.
For more, visit her faculty webpage here.
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WATCHING ME
The War on Crime, Privacy, and the State
BY KIMBERLY D. BAILEY

I

n the criminal justice context, the state engages in an unjustifiable privacy invasion whenever the monitoring of its
citizens results in the abuse of its power. This abuse can
come in the form of the prohibition of activities that society
views as valuable; the creation of a sense of being constantly monitored by the state, which then has a chilling effect on
these activities; or the unjustifiable aggregation of data on the
state’s citizens. These abuses result in serious dignitary harms
because of the level of suspicion and distrust they thrust upon
the individual.
According to Anglo-American ethicists in the Kantian tradition, “[s]elf consciousness, free-will, rationality, moral agency, and the ability to form life plans are essential traits of personhood.” Privacy creates, sustains, and enhances personhood
because it provides individuals with the space to develop these
traits without the fear of being monitored, judged, and sometimes even unjustifiably punished. The war on crime creates
such an oppressive feeling of being watched by the state, that
it at minimum has a chilling effect on poor people of color’s
self-determination, self-expression, and freedom of association.
Excerpted from Watching Me: The War on Crime, Privacy, and the State, 47 U.C. Davis Law
Review 1539 (2014)

FALL 2015 [ 3 ]

Kimberly Bailey

Self-determination enables an individual
to create the life that one wants to create.
Self-expression and freedom of association allow for the free exchange of ideas
and experimentation with one’s identity,
which are both important for self-development. They also make it easier for one’s
ideas and cultural identity to become part
of mainstream political discourse. In addition, freedom of association, particularly
with a diverse group of people, increases
a poor person of color’s social capital and
chances for upward mobility.
Because privacy is the foundation for
freedoms that enable the creation of one’s
identity and life plans, the more privacy
one has, the less vulnerable he is to oppressive state social control. For this reason,
the level of privacy granted by the state
has historically tracked the level of one’s
political power and status. Wealthy, white
men historically have had the greatest
amount of privacy; women, the poor, and
people of color have had the least amount
of privacy, and, therefore, they have been
vulnerable to more severe policies of state
social control.

S

cholars have documented the fact that
the poor and people of color continue
to have the least amount of privacy in our
society and, therefore, they are still the
most vulnerable to more extreme state
social control policies.

I

n addition to making poor people of
color more vulnerable to oppressive
state social control, the war on crime
has also created serious dignitary harms.
When the state curtails privacy, it sends
a powerful message: an individual cannot
be trusted to use his privacy in legitimate
ways. For example, parents tend to give
their children less privacy because they do
not yet trust that the children have the
maturity and wisdom not to make choices

[ 4 ] IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES

that could potentially harm themselves or
others. Likewise, one reason we limit the
privacy of prisoners is because their past
acts suggest that we cannot trust them not
to engage in criminal and potentially dangerous activities, at least for a set period
of time. The lack of trust expressed by the
state through the war on crime, therefore,
at best resembles a form of paternalism; at
worst, it resembles a form de facto criminalization of individuals simply because
they are poor and of color. These individuals logically conclude that the state does
not respect them nor does it view their
identities and viewpoints as equal to those
of white and wealthier citizens.
It is important to stress just how intrusive stops-and-frisks and motor stops
are; they are more than just minor annoyances. Many individuals, particularly
young men of color, must endure these
stops monthly, weekly, and sometimes
even daily. The intensity and frequency
of these stops makes these individuals feel
as if they are constantly being watched by
the state. As a result, some inner-city residents of New York have reported that they
limit the amount of time that they spend
on the street and that they go outside
only when necessary in order to mitigate
constant monitoring by the police and to
maintain some sense of anonymity from
the state. This limitation on their mobility necessarily undermines their ability to
create the types of lives that they want to
create through self-determination. This
limitation also has a chilling effect on their
associations with their neighbors, and it
makes associations with those outside of
their neighborhood, particularly those
who are of other races, very difficult. In
addition, the fact that some poor people
of color feel the need to look less “ethnic”
in order to avoid being a target for constant monitoring, because of racial and
socioeconomic biases, shows that the war

Watching Me

on crime has led some to severely limit
their sense of self-expression out of desire
to keep some of their privacy. This fact is
significant because how one dresses and
how one wears one’s hair are important
expressions of one’s personal and cultural
identity.

T

hese stops are also problematic
because this constant barrage of
questioning regarding one’s activities and
comings and goings expresses the lack of
trust that the state has for poor people of
color. It does not matter that innocent
individuals do not have anything to hide,
this lack of trust shows a suspicion that
these individuals need to be constantly
watched in order to keep them in line.

have such a chilling effect, especially for
innocent individuals who have nothing to
hide or for those who do not even know
that the data collection is happening. The
problem is that even innocent conduct
can sometimes be embarrassing or simply
politically unpopular. This type of information could potentially affect one’s job
prospects, housing opportunities, and
social relationships if made public. Furthermore, the volume of information that
the state can gather through technology
is much greater than traditional police
surveillance techniques. For these reasons, some anonymity from the state via
technology is essential in order to prevent
this type of information from providing
opportunities for state abuse.

“Because privacy is the foundation for freedoms that
enable the creation of one’s identity and life plans,
the more privacy one has, the less vulnerable he is to
oppressive state social control.”
The fact that this sentiment is often
expressed in a public setting intensifies
the insult to their dignity because these
individuals must bear the shame that others might assume that the stops confirm
that poor people of color must always be
watched. Furthermore, the fact that white
and wealthier individuals do not have to
endure these stops with the frequency
that poor people of color do expresses
that whites and wealthier individuals are
worthy of more privacy, and, therefore,
more trust and respect.
Another troubling aspect of the war
on crime is the practice of data collection
through technology . . . Some may think it
alarmist to consider whether the aggregation of data through technology will really

A

nother weapon in the war on crime
arsenal is the snitch. It is important
to differentiate snitches from law-abiding
citizens who report crime in their communities. A snitch is someone who engages in
crime and then reports criminal activity
to the government in order to obtain lesser punishment or no punishment at all ...
Because drug arrests disproportionately
affect African-Americans and Latinos,
there are a disproportionate number of
snitches in their neighborhoods as “criminal offenders actively [seek] information
in order to ‘work off’ their own charges.”

T

he use of snitching instills the realistic fear that one’s neighbors, family
members, or friends might be spying on
FALL 2015 [ 5 ]
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him. Snitching, therefore, potentially
chills freedom of expression and association because individuals do not know
whom they can trust with knowledge
about their thoughts, feelings, and conduct. Anything they say or do might
later be used against them by the state.
Indeed, snitches increase the access that
the state has to an individual’s private
information because they supplement the
limited resources the state typically has
to monitor its citizens. The harms caused
by snitching are heightened by the fact
that a snitch might be a family member.
Snitching is another way that poor people
of color feel mistrust and suspicion from
the government. Furthermore, creating
an atmosphere where individuals mistrust
members of their own household expresses complete contempt for the privacy of
poor people of color, since privacy in the
home is supposed to be highly valued.
Each of the tactics I have described
in this Part is troubling in its own right.
Yet, many individuals, particularly poor,
young urban males of color, endure many
of them simultaneously. They endure
constant stops-and-frisks, which could
potentially lead to their personal information being placed in a gang database. They
might also have to provide a DNA swab in
order to terminate their encounters with
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the police. Law enforcement might track
them further through their cell phones
and social networking pages. Due to oppressive overcharging policies regarding
minor offenses, they are in more danger
of being convicted of crimes, which also
leads to heightened surveillance. Even if
a young man of color avoids a conviction,
he still has to worry about a close friend
or neighbor snitching on him so that he
might avoid his own potentially hefty
sentence. As already described, the aggregation of these forms of monitoring by
the state have the potential for substantial
chilling effects on activities we typically
value in our democratic society, and they
■
also create serious dignitary harms.
KIMBERLY BAILEY
SELECTED PUBLICATIONS
Articles
It’s Complicated: Privacy and Domestic Violence,
49 American Criminal Law Review 1777 (2012).
Lost in Translation: Domestic Violence, “The
Personal is Political,” and the Criminal Justice
System, 100 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1255 (2010).
The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis: Deconstructing the Sound of Silence, 2009 Brigham
Young University Law Review 1.
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lexander Boni-Saenz earned a J.D. magna cum laude from Harvard Law School, where
he was a notes editor on the Harvard Law Review. He also holds a M.Sc. with distinction
in Social Policy from the London School of Economics and an A.B. magna cum laude with
highest honors in Psychology and Government from Harvard College.
Prior to joining the IIT Chicago-Kent faculty, Professor Boni-Saenz was a Bigelow Fellow
and Lecturer at University of Chicago Law School. He practiced law as a Skadden Fellow at
the Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago, where he created a medical-legal
partnership for low-income seniors. He also clerked for Judge Diane P. Wood of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Professor Boni-Saenz’s scholarship focuses on how legal doctrines and institutions can respond to the challenges and opportunities of an aging population. His scholarly work is interdisciplinary in nature and touches on several areas, including disability law, family law, health
law, and trusts and estates. He teaches courses in Health Law, Property, and Trusts and Estates.
For more, visit his faculty webpage here.
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SEXUALITY AND
INCAPACITY
BY ALEXANDER BONI-SAENZ

H

enry Rayhons and Donna Young did not expect to
find love again after being widowed. They met in
their late 60s, and first flirted in church while singing
for the choir. Two years later, they were getting married in front
of over 350 guests. Now in their 70s, they enjoyed several activities together, such as beekeeping, farming, and long leisurely
drives. They also had sex. In 2010, Donna was diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s Disease. As her condition worsened, two of her
daughters from a previous marriage moved her to a residential
care facility. Henry would regularly visit her, and on one visit in May 2014, Donna’s roommate thought she heard sexual
noises coming from across the privacy curtain in their shared
room. This led Donna’s daughters to seek guardianship over
Donna and to limit Henry’s interactions with her. On August
8, 2014, Donna passed away. A week later, Henry was arrested
and charged with felony sexual abuse on the basis that Donna
Rayhons suffered a “mental defect” that made her unable to
consent. Henry abandoned his run for another term as a state
legislator, and the criminal case garnered national media attention. A week-long trial exposed details of Donna and Hen-

An excerpt from Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 Ohio State Law Journal ___ (forthcoming)
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ry’s relationship, Donna’s medical condition, and their alleged sexual encounter in
May. After two days of deliberations, the
jury acquitted Henry of wrongdoing.
Henry and Donna’s romance highlights how important sexuality can be
to human flourishing, even in later life.
Sexuality represents a unique source of
pleasure, meaning, and social connection. The Supreme Court has recognized
a sexual liberty interest in Lawrence v.
Texas, though its dimensions are actively
debated by scholars. Other areas related to
sexuality have also received constitutional
protection. Marriage, which is the social
institutionalization of a form of sexuality, has been deemed fundamental by the

responsible for safeguarding those with
cognitive impairments. The threat of this
liability often leads institutions to establish
highly restrictive sexual environments, especially in response to family member requests.
The law also has expressive effects
when it invalidates the apparent consent
choices of those who are deemed to lack
legal capacity. This is clearest in the case
of criminal prohibitions, which carry
the weight of societal condemnation for
the acts that are deemed criminal. But
both civil and criminal doctrines act to
construct the sexualities of citizens by
demarcating the boundaries of acceptable
and unacceptable sex and reinforcing ex-

“The right to sexual expression should not be
withheld due to cognitive impairment alone.”
Court. The Court has also closely guarded
the related principle of bodily integrity,
though the constitutional justifications for
this principle vary. Whatever the contours
of a right to sexual expression might be,
the degree to which it extends to people
who have cognitive impairments remains
unexplored.

T

he criminal charges against Henry
show how the law can be used to regulate relationships and sexuality. The sexual incapacity doctrines that were at play in
that case are perhaps the most important
form of sexual regulation, as they control
access to sex by designating who is legally
capable of sexual consent. When someone
is deemed to lack legal capacity, the law imposes civil and criminal liability on sexual
partners for battery and rape. In addition,
it triggers vicarious liability and regulatory consequences for institutions that are
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isting understandings of the sexuality of
certain groups. To the degree that a class
of individuals is deemed to lack sexual
consent capacity, this can devalue them
and construct them either as asexual and
undesirable or as hypersexual and in need
of control.
Sexual incapacity doctrines, however, shape more than just the older adult
sexuality of Henry and Donna Rayhons.
They have a wide reach, affecting sexually
precocious minors, intoxicated teenagers
on college campuses, and younger adults
with Down Syndrome as well. Most states
have adopted incapacity tests for adults
that focus narrowly on assessing an individual’s cognitive abilities. These tests
serve an important protective function for
individuals with temporary and transient
incapacity, such as those rendered incapable due to alcohol or drugs. However, this
comes at the cost of barring many people

Sexuality and Incapacity

with persistent forms of incapacity from
any sexual activity. This is despite the fact
that said individuals often still have sexual
desires and are able to engage in sexual
decision-making with support from caregiving networks. By applying a test that
focuses narrowly on cognitive abilities to
individuals with persistent impairments,
courts are unnecessarily and permanently restricting the sexual expression of
millions of individuals, with intensely
negative social, psychological, and health
consequences.

T

he central claim of this Article is that
sexual incapacity doctrine should
grant legal capacity to adults with persistent cognitive impairments if they are
embedded in an adequate decision-making
support network. In other words, the right
to sexual expression should not be withheld
due to cognitive impairment alone. It then
sets forth a novel sexual consent capacity
test for this population: cognition-plus.
To justify this claim and corresponding
legal test, the Article provides a theory of
sexual incapacity doctrine that is normatively grounded in sexual capability, or the
opportunity to pursue functionings associated with sex and sexuality. This could
include having sexual pleasure, forming a
sexual identity, or feeling sexy. The focus of
sexual capability is on ensuring opportunities rather than on guaranteeing happiness,
economic resources, or freedom from state
interference. However, capability can overlap significantly with these other measures
of well-being. For example, a society that
socializes its citizens to think that sex is
dirty, that criminalizes non-marital sexual
conduct, and that provides no protections
against sexual violence, denies its citizens
the capability for a healthy sexual life. Its
citizens may also be less likely to be happy.
Even if society does provide all that
is necessary for a healthy sexual life,

individual members of that society might,
however, still pursue unhealthy sexual
relationships or deny themselves sexual
partners altogether, despite the desire for
them. In other words, they might not take
advantage of the opportunities to which
they have access. Ultimately, it is the right
of each individual to decide whether to
pursue the functionings that are within
reach. In this way, sexual capability is
agnostic as to people’s sexual choices, as
the focus is on creating the ability to have
meaningful choice.
An individual’s sexual capability is a
product not only of that person’s cognitive
abilities, but also of her social resources
and the legal treatment of those abilities
and resources. An analogy to driving is
helpful. In order to have the ability to drive
to work, one must possess physical and
mental capacities to drive, the resources
to buy a vehicle to transport oneself, the
legal entitlement of a driver’s license, and
adequately paved roads to get from point
A to point B. The inability to drive to work
might reflect any or all of these factors.
Disability theorists have long emphasized
that disabilities are not only created by the
physical or mental impairments of the individual, but also by a society that refuses
to accommodate these impairments. One
important resource that many people with
persistent cognitive impairments possess is
a decision-making support network composed of a single caregiver, a set of family
members, or an institution’s staff. These
capability-enhancing networks, however,
are not recognized by the law in this area.
The cognition-plus test represents
the legal implementation of the sexual
capability value for people with persistent
cognitive impairments. It derives its name
from a joint focus on the mental capacities of the subject (cognition) and the
recognition that some individuals achieve
sexual decision-making capacity through
FALL 2015 [ 11 ]
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the assistance of a decision-making support network (plus). The test proceeds
in three general steps. The first step is
to gauge whether the individual has the
threshold capacity to express volition
with respect to a sexual decision. Without
this manifestation of desire, one cannot
proceed to be a sexual agent. If the first
step is satisfied, the second step is to assess
whether the individual has the necessary
mental capacities to understand and reason about the nature and consequences of
a given sexual decision. If one meets this
requirement, then one has sexual consent
capacity without the need for assistance.

I

f one does not meet that requirement,
however, the third step is to evaluate whether there is an adequate decision-making support network in place.
These networks can provide support to
an individual in formulating her purposes, connecting her desires with options,
communicating with others, and creating
a safe space to engage in sexual expression.
Assessment of the system would be contextual in nature, guided by the principles of
loyalty and care from fiduciary law. Thus,
courts would evaluate whether the system
is free from conflicts of interest, has adequate knowledge of the individual and the
sexual decision, and has taken reasonable
steps to protect the individual with cognitive impairments from the threat of sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy. If
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the system is adequate, then the individual
possesses sexual consent capacity.
Both sexuality and incapacity are
inescapable features of the human condition. They need not be mutually exclusive,
but current sexual incapacity doctrines
make them so for many by creating unduly restrictive sexual environments and
contributing to pernicious social norms.
The cognition-plus approach strikes the
correct balance between protection and
restriction, has a sound theoretical basis,
guards against courts dictating which
sexual acts are appropriate, and provides
more predictability to institutions in
formulating resident sexual policies and
■
practices.
ALEXANDER BONI-SAENZ
SELECTED PUBLICATIONS
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The Economic Burden of End-of-Life Illness, in
Palliative Care: Core Skills and Clinical Competencies (Elsevier 2d ed. 2011) (with K. Covinsky &
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R

ichard Warner is Professor and Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar at the Chicago-Kent
College of Law, where he is also the Faculty Director of Chicago-Kent’s Center for Law
and Computers. From 1994 to 1996, he was president of InterActive Computer Tutorials, a
software company, and from 1998 to 2000, he was director of Building Businesses on the Web,
an Illinois Institute of Technology executive education program. He was the principal investigator for “Using Education to Combat White Collar Crime,” a U.S. State Department grant
devoted to combating money laundering in Ukraine from 2000 to 2006.
Prof. Warner is currently a member of the U.S. Secret Service’s Electronic and Financial
Crimes Taskforce. He is a visiting foreign professor at University of Gdańsk, Poland, and the
founder and director of the School of American Law with branches in Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia.
He teaches Contracts, Remedies, Jurisprudence, Online Privacy and Security, and E-Commerce. His most recent book is Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online Privacy and Security,
co-authored with Robert Sloan. For more, visit his faculty webpage here.

R

obert H. Sloan is professor and Head of the Computer
Science Department at the University of Illinois, Chicago.
He has collaborated on numerous works with Richard Warner
about the impact of technology and changing social dynamics
on privacy.
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THE SELF, THE STASI,
THE NSA

Privacy, Knowledge, and Complicity in the
Surveillance State
BY RICHARD WARNER AND ROBERT H. SLOAN

I

n 2007, the security expert Bruce Schneier noted that,
History will record what we, here in the early decades of
the information age, did to foster freedom, liberty, and
democracy. Did we build information technologies that
protected people’s freedoms even during times when society tried to subvert them? Or did we build technologies that could easily be modified to watch and control?

Is the answer already obvious? A large literature now details
the “watch and control” practices of businesses and governments. Add Edward Snowden’s revelations, and it is hard to
avoid Schneier’s own 2013 “watch and control” conclusion:
So we’re done. Welcome to a world where Google
knows exactly what sort of porn you all like, and more
about your interests than your spouse does. Welcome to
a world where your cell phone company knows exactly
where you are all the time. Welcome to the end of private conversations, because increasingly your conversaA summary of The Self, the Stasi, the NSA: Privacy, Knowledge, and Complicity in the
Surveillance State, ___ Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology ___ (forthcoming)
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tions are conducted by e-mail,
text, or social networking sites.
And welcome to a world where all
of this, and everything else that
you do or is done on a computer, is saved, correlated, studied,
passed around from company to
company without your knowledge
or consent; and where the government accesses it at will without a
warrant. Welcome to an Internet
without privacy, and we’ve ended
up here with hardly a fight.
Are we done? Our answer is, “Not
yet.” An adequate degree of privacy may
still be possible. We conclude with a suggestion about what is necessary to make
that possibility a reality.

W

e focus exclusively on governmental
surveillance. We also confine our attention to informational privacy, the ability to determine what others do with your
information. Advances in information processing technology reduce privacy by giving others immense and increasing control
over your information. This is particularly
true of privacy in public. The notion of privacy in public dates back over a century, at
least to the work of the German sociologist
Georg Simmel, who observed that people
voluntarily limit their knowledge of each
other as they interact in a wide variety of
social and commercial roles. The mutual
restraint ensures that information remains
private relative to the interaction even if it
is otherwise publicly available.
Current governmental surveillance
reduces privacy in public. But to what
extent? The question matters because adequate self-realization requires adequate
privacy in public. That in turn depends on
informational norms, social norms that
govern the collection, use, and distribution of information. Current surveillance
[ 16 ] IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES

practices threaten to undermine norm-enabled coordination and thereby to undermine privacy in public. The 1950 to 1990
East German Stasi illustrates the threat.
The “hidden, but for every citizen tangible omnipresence of the Stasi, damaged
the very basic conditions for individual
and societal creativity and development:
Sense of one’s self, Trust, Spontaneity.”
The United States is not East Germany,
but it is on the road that leads there. And
that raises the question of how far it will
travel. Sections I – IV support the “on the
road” claim. Section V explores how far
the United States will go down that road.

“The United States certainly
outdoes the Stasi in the
amount it knows . . .”
Section I characterizes the concept
of privacy in public and argues that
informational norms play a central role in
the creating of privacy in public. Section
II connects the loss of privacy in public
to the loss of self-realization. Section
III presents five surveillance concepts
essential to our explanation of why
governmental surveillance undermines
norm-enabled privacy in public. Section
IV uses that conceptual framework to
construct a model of how surveillance
undermines privacy in public. Section V
uses that model to address the question
of how far the United States may travel
down the road toward a Stasi-like world.

R

ealizing a multifaceted self means
realizing multiple social roles, and
that requires privacy in public. Perhaps
the most obvious reason is that combining
roles may violate others’ expectations.
Avoiding disapproval and reprisal are
not, however, the only reasons to seek

The Self, the Stasi, the NSA

privacy in public. Imagine, for example,
that you eat frequently in a small Italian
trattoria. You want to play the role of
“customer they know very little about” in
order to have an experience as disconnected as possible from the rest of your life.
You want a pleasant break from that life.
Your concern is not with their approval
or disapproval. It is just with what they
know. You do not merely care that more
knowledge would change the way they relate to you. You do not want to have even
to think about whether it might do that.
The restaurant example illustrates two
key points. First, social roles are typically
defined in part by the way you appear to
others when you are in them. Second,
how you appear to others depends on
what those others know.
In general, different requirements on
what one is allowed, expected, or required
to reveal or not reveal define different relationships with governmental authorities,
acquaintances, colleagues, friends, family,
employers, and so on. The point is a familiar one in sociology. As the sociologist
Nippert-Eng emphasizes:

“Statue of workers and Police officer in front of Stasi archives,
Mitte district, Berlin,” photo by Sanandros. From Wikipedia,
November 11, 2015. Image modified under CC License.

At its core, managing privacy is
about managing relationships
between the self and others. ...
privacy ... [is] a “boundary regulatory process by which a person
(or group) makes himself more
or less accessible and open to
others.” When we regulate our
accessibility to others—including
the accessibility of information,
objects, space, time, or anything
else that we deem private—we
simultaneously regulate our relationships with them.

T

he history of the Stasi makes current
surveillance practices stand out in
sharp relief. Four features characterized the
Stasi’s surveillance practices.
First, massive knowing: As we noted
earlier, the Stasi engaged in massive data
collection and hence knew a great deal
about East German citizens.
Second, complicity: Informants “spied
on friends, workmates, neighbours and
family members. Husbands spied on
wives.” Even if the people with whom you
interacted were not Stasi informants, the
1 in 50 distribution of informants made
it likely that friends and acquaintances
of your friends and acquaintances would
be. “Relations between people were conditioned by the fact that one or the other
of you could be one of them [the Stasi].
Everyone suspected everyone else and the
mistrust this bred was the foundation of
social existence.”
Third, pervasive repressive use: The Stasi translated its massive merely knowing
into pervasive repressive use:
At its heart, the Stasi was an organization that monitored society for those
who . . . ‘thought differently.’ Stasi officers
worked tirelessly to insure that a disruption to the socialist order—be it anti-state
graffiti, the establishment of groups that
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did not conform to the SED’s world-view,
defections, or whatever form it might
take—did not occur.
As the novelist Anna Funder notes in
her study of the Stasi, it “arrested, imprisoned and interrogated anyone it chose.”
Fourth, curtailed self-realization:
Merely knowing, complicity, and repressive use severely curtailed possibilities for
self-realization. As Gary Bruce puts it in
his study of the Stasi,
One does not detect from East
Germans’ reflections on their past
that they were gripped by a paralyzing fear, in the psychological
sense of the word—although one
interview subject did say she “was
always afraid”—but rather a deep
resignation that one was not the
master of one’s own destiny, that
to run afoul of the Stasi, even
unintentionally, was to sacrifice
power over one’s life and the life
opportunities of family members.

T

he United States certainly outdoes the
Stasi in the amount it knows and—
perhaps—even in the extent of citizen
complicity. In this way, the United States
has traveled down the road that leads to
the Stasi. But it is far from Stasi-like surveillance. It differs—only but critically—in
being far more restrained in its use of information to discourage and prevent behavior
the government finds undesirable. This is
less reassuring than it may seem, however.
As James Rule notes, there is a “tendency
of surveillance systems to spread. It simply
lies in the interests of both government
and private surveillance operations to expand—to cover more people and more of
the lives of the people they cover.”
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W

e conclude with Glen Greenwald’s
2014 version of Schneier’s 2007
question with which we began:

We stand at a historic crossroads.
Will the digital age usher in the
individual liberation and political freedoms that the Internet is
uniquely capable of unleashing?
Or will it bring about a system of
omnipresent monitoring and control, beyond the dreams of even
the greatest tyrants of the past?
Right now, either path is possible.
Our actions will determine where
■
we end up.
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THE MIT SCHOOL OF LAW?
A Perspective on Legal Education in the 21st Century
BY DANIEL MARTIN KATZ

D

espite some of the blustery rhetoric attendant to the
ongoing market transition, lawyers and the market for
legal services are not going away. Lawyers serve integral roles in a wide variety of social and political systems. Their
work supports the proper functioning of markets and helps individuals and organizations vindicate their respective rights. At
the same time, the processes associated with completing their
work—as well as the contours of their respective expertise and
judgment—are already changing. These changes are being
driven by a number of economic and technological trends,
many of which Larry Ribstein identified in a series of important articles published in the years before his untimely death.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the legal services industry is not a monolith, and change has and will continue to
manifest in different ways across different tranches of work. At
the high end of the market, lawyers often help their clients navigate increasingly complex legal, regulatory, and institutional
environments. Indeed, helping navigate complexity is part of
the core value proposition offered by a significant number of
lawyers. Arguably, the legal system and society are getting more
An excerpt from The MIT School of Law? A Perspective on Legal Education in the 21st
Century, 5 University of Illinois Law Review 1431 (2014).
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complex; given complexity is at the core
of bespoke work, the market for lawyers
that can thrive in complex environments
should remain robust. The ongoing
question for legal educators is how best
to equip future legal professionals to deliver value for their respective clients in a
variety of complex multi-disciplinary environments. Whether it is a multi-billion
dollar M&A deal, the construction of a
comprehensive and legally defensible document management and retention system,
a challenging piece of bio-tech centered
patent infringement litigation, or Dodd
Frank compliance, high-end lawyering is
an exercise in helping clients navigate in
opaque environments.

D

espite growth in complexity and likely inelastic demand for the very best
lawyers, a non-trivial fraction of today’s
legal work is not high-end legal architecting and does not require nearly as many
individuals in order to see the work accomplished. For a certain range of tasks, high
cost human capital can be substituted for
less expensive alternatives—whether this
is through labor arbitrage, better processes, or software. In the medium and long
term, some of the largest financial returns
likely will be obtained by the set of individuals who are able to help transition the
legal industry to the proper reallocation of
the legal production function. Both existing lawyers and law students are awakening
to this reality and a non-trivial number are
building companies that will help support
the transition.
The transition is underway in high
to medium complexity work and to a
lesser extent in the retail segment of the
legal market. So-called “regular people
law”—i.e., affordable legal services for the
middle class, pro-bono and “low bono”
market segment—still remains illusive.
Using technology, process, and lower cost
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infrastructure, there are a number of notable efforts to better serve the underserved
and thereby meaningfully and sustainably
provide access to justice. However, much
more work remains to be done.
As Larry predicted, law’s information
revolution is very much underway. Whether the clients are institutions or just regular folks, it is a process and efficiency revolution. For lawyers, substantive expertise
is (of course) a minimum expectation, but
going forward it may not be the primary
dimension of competition. Within legal
organizations (both law firms and, more
importantly, corporate law divisions) and
in the legal entrepreneurship community,
process, workflow, metrics, efficiency, and
analytics are beginning to take hold. It is
transforming the practice of law in ways
that are not yet fully realized. Complete
change typically takes longer than it
should. Organizations are sticky, due to
noisy signaling and other factors, and
markets take time to clear. But there are
signs that this time is indeed different.
Taking stock of these changes, this
Essay is a thought exercise about a hypothetical MIT School of Law—an
institution with the type of curriculum
that might help prepare students to have
the appropriate level of substantive legal
expertise and other useful skills that will
allow them to deliver value to their clients
as well as develop and administer the rules
governing markets, politics, and society as
we move further into the 21st Century. It
is a blueprint based upon the best available information, and like any other plan
of action would need to be modified to
take stock of shifting realities over time.
It is not a solution for all of legal education. Instead, it is a targeted description
of an institution and its substantive content that could compete very favorably
in the existing and future market. It is a
depiction of an institution whose students

The MIT School of Law?

would arguably be in high demand. It is
a high-level sketch of an institution that
would be substantively relevant, appropriately practical, theoretically rigorous, and
world class. In other words, it is a plant
that can survive and thrive outside those
hothouse walls.

I

f Larry was right and law schools now
have to deal with markets, the question
is how best to do so. As of this very minute, there are approximately two graduating law students for each available law job.
This situation will hopefully improve in

ria, while many others fall short. As Bill
Henderson has argued: “[T]he new gold
standard employment outcome is fulltime, long-term professional law-related
jobs. The issue of how to maximize this
outcome is so pressing and intricate that it
may warrant trade-offs in the admissions
process, favoring students will lower credentials but more rock-solid employment
prospects on the backend at graduation.”
The key is to build a better product
and demonstrate its superiority to the
marketplace. Obviously, this is a non-trivial endeavor. The first question to ponder

“[L]aw’s information revolution is very much underway.
Whether the clients are institutions or just regular
folks, it is a process and efficency revolution.”
the coming years, but, generally speaking,
changing the macroeconomic environment
is not within the province of an individual
educational institution. The demand for
legal services is set exogenously by the
dynamics of the relevant market(s). What
an individual institution can do is compete
and do the best possible with respect to
its students. For many institutions, if
they accept the status quo contours of the
market as given, they will underperform.
The way to win is to stop trying to be the
“50th or 100th best Harvard and Yale” and
instead to concentrate on outflanking these
and other institutions by becoming leaders
in law’s major emerging employment
sectors.
The objective function that educational institutions must seek to optimize is
high quality jobs that support the respective educational investment by students.
Some institutions easily satisfy this crite-

is what precisely constitutes a better product? Better for what set of tasks that lawyers undertake? The legal education and
legal services market contain a series of
market distortions, information asymmetries, and agency problems. In addition,
both the market for legal education and a
market for legal services feature a variety
of noisy signals. Namely, it is difficult to
overcome strong brands and the noisy
lagging signals that surround the classification of quality. At all places within the
industry—law schools, law professors,
practicing lawyers, law firms, and general counsels—assessing the quality of the
relevant product or service is extremely
difficult.
On the education side of the equation, students historically seek branded
institutions. Specifically, they tended to
seek institutions with higher U.S. News
rankings. The general assumption held
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by students (and faculty) is that a higher
ranked institution would result in better
labor market outcomes (as measured by
dollars or other related quality measures).
From the perspective of many students,
whether those outcomes were due to
sorting or the treatment effect of the
underlying education is actually immaterial. The would-be students voted with
their feet and they often did so with little
deep understanding of the quality of the
product being offered or how their respective skills or background were suited
to offerings at particular institutions. In
many unfortunate instances, would-be
students were often myopic about their
own likely prospects—their own “lives
in the law.” Incoming students too often
selected programs, academic tracks, and
institutions that were poorly configured
to the economic realities of their current
and future legal labor market.

T

he legal labor market (particularly
at the entry level) is also very noisy.
Large law firm partners sell their time as
well as the time of their associates to their
clients. To the extent there were questions
raised regarding why a particular associate was working on their matter, the firm
could answer with statements such as “well
they went to XYZ elite institution or were
at the very top of their class at ABC regional institution.” This brand signal served as
a placeholder for quality because, as noted
above, lawyer quality is among the most
difficult of measurement problems. Both
in law and in consumer markets generally, in the absence of clearly better alternative measures, firms and clients fixate on
well-established brands.
An entrepreneurially-minded law
school has to overcome the existing brand
signals. This is necessary as the institution
seeks to obtain an increasing share of the
existing jobs, and it is important in order

[ 24 ] IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES

to position its students to take advantage
of places where new labor market openings are created. The high level workflow is
simple—train, attract, and place students
(in that order). To understand where the
placement opportunities lie, one must
work backwards starting with the employment end of the pipeline and ask employers this question: “What would it take for
you to hire one (or more) of our graduates?” This information is a useful starting
point but not complete because the target
is shifting and thus even the employers are
not quite sure what they want.
For example, a recent MacArthur
Foundation study noted sixty-five percent of grad school students will end up
undertaking a job that has not yet been
invented. While such extreme uncertainty
is arguably not present in the legal services
industry, this statistic points us to a basic
insight regarding labor markets—past
performance is not necessarily indicative
of future results. This is particularly true
■
in periods of disruption.
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